Trade and Structural Change in Pacific Asia by Colin I. Bradford, Jr
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Trade and Structural Change in Pacific Asia
Volume Author/Editor: Colin I. Bradford, Jr. and William H. Branson, editors




Chapter Title: NICs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies
Chapter Author: Colin I. Bradford, Jr
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6922
Chapter pages in book: (p. 173 - 204)7  NICs and the Next-Tier 
NICs as Transitional 
Economies 
Colin I. Bradford, Jr. 
7.1  Introduction 
A focus of this volume is the degree of linkage between the performance 
of  the domestic economies of the industrializing developing countries 
of East and Southeast Asia and their external performance as exporters 
of manufactures. Some of the economic literature in recent years deal- 
ing with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) and outward-oriented 
growth strategies has emphasized the degree to which trade has driven 
development through demand. The country studies in this volume have 
included a focus on the evolution of the internal structure of production 
in  its supply dimension  as facilitating if  not indeed determining the 
volume and composition of manufactured exports of specific countries. 
This chapter examines various aspects of this focus in a comparative 
context that includes European and Latin American NICs and next- 
tier NICs. 
There is a continuing debate in economics about the relative efficacy 
of policies and markets in influencing economic outcomes. This debate 
has particular poignancy today in relation to the role of  developing- 
country economic policies and price systems in causing and resolving 
world debt and international trade problems. The NICs and next-tier 
NICs are of particular interest because of their emergence (or potential 
emergence) as exporters of manufactured goods on a global scale and 
because of their generally high level of debt financing. These new roles 
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of the NICs in world trade and finance raise a number of broad issues 
which will be examined in this chapter. 
One issue is the degree to which the NICs are part  of  a general 
process of economic development which yields relatively predictable 
patterns of internal structural change (in the Hollis Chenery tradition) 
and of  changes in the product  composition of  exports according to 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade based on factor proportions. The next section 
examines data on the structure and changes in composition of fifteen 
leading exports in sixteen transitional economies according to changing 
factor proportions over time and as incomes increase. The evidence 
from these data has a bearing on the degree to which trade pressures 
are alleviated by countries moving along a spectrum of factor intensities 
of export composition or are exacerbated by competition from new 
exporters in existing, relatively static markets. To the extent that the 
cross-sectional and inter-temporal data are consistent with the factor 
proportions  explanation of  structural change in trade, they  provide 
some evidence that the development process contains within it its own 
source of  relief from transitional trade pressures.  These sources of 
relief tend to be supported by market forces affecting factors of pro- 
duction and final goods, though government policies can enhance or 
impede them. 
If changes in the composition of trade are linked to changes in the 
internal  structure of  production, the expectation  would  be that the 
NICs, with above-average rates of export growth and economic growth, 
would be countries with accelerated rates of structural change facili- 
tated  by  high rates of capital formation.  Section 7.3 examines com- 
parative data on investment at international prices among the transi- 
tional  economies  to ascertain the  importance  of  domestic  policies 
affecting interest rates and credit allocations in distinguishing the NICs 
from other developing economies. Data supporting these notions reveal 
the importance of policies in determining export performance and add 
domestic monetary and fiscal policies to the emphasis given in earlier 
literature (Krueger 1978; Balassa 1978; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1979; 
and Bradford  1982b) to trade and exchange rate policies as important 
variables explaining the NIC phenomenon. 
The above inquiry leads to an examination of price distortions and 
the relationship between price distortions and the implementation of 
successful outward-oriented growth strategies. There is some literature 
which attempts to equate outward-oriented growth strategies with re- 
liance on market forces and price signals. There is a tendency in these 
analyses to stereotype the market liberalization and outward-oriented 
approaches supposedly adopted by the Asian NICs and the more in- 
terventionist  and  inward-oriented  approaches  identified  with  Latin 
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and outward-looking developing countries from Asia and Latin Amer- 
ica to ascertain how clear-cut the stylized dichotomy is in reality. 
7.2  Factor Intensities and Structural Change in Exports 
The rise of NIC exports of manufactures can be seen as Heckscher- 
Ohlin trade  based  on changing factor proportions  over time which 
results in shifts in the structure of trade. In the tradition of Colin Clark, 
economies are seen to move from primary product production to man- 
ufacturing to services in domestic output and from natural-resource- 
intensive to unskilled-labor-intensive to physical- and human-capital- 
intensive in the product composition of exports. 
This view of the development process yields a concomitant view of 
trade adjustment in which countries move through different “stages” 
of comparative advantage (Balassa 1977) as the product composition 
of exports shifts along a spectrum of factor intensities. Since all coun- 
tries are moving along the same spectrum, movement by countries 
further along the scale makes room for countries down the scale.  The 
source of the problems of trade tensions, in this view, is simultaneously 
the source of trade adjustment (see Balassa 1977, 26-27).*  The only 
caveat-and  it is an important one in the current circumstances-is 
that world trade adjustment depends heavily on continued economic 
growth in the major blocs of  countries.  Slow growth in one tier of 
countries slows growth in the next tier, dampening structural change 
in both tiers and worsening trade adjustment. 
The analysis in this section will examine the NICs as countries ex- 
periencing transitional growth, that is, transformation from low-income, 
low-growth economies to more advanced industrial countries. T’he  na- 
ture of the dynamic underlying NIC export growth can be most effec- 
tively understood in a perspective which compares them with the next- 
tier NICs and with industrial countries. We  are interested less in the 
NICs than in the NIC phenomenon as a transition process which is 
best understood in comparative perspective. This analysis will be in 
the “half-way house”  mode between general theories of patterns of 
development a la Chenery and the more historical approaches empha- 
sizing countries’ unique experiences (Ranis 1983, 5; Ohkawa, Fei, and 
Ranis, 1983, 2). “What clearly seems to be evolving is the recognition 
that we all are looking for some sort of half-way house between an 
ever-elusive general theory of development and the unacceptable no- 
tion that every country differs so fundamentally from every other at 
every point in time that nothing can be said which is of  generalized 
value”  (Ranis 1983, 5). 
The NIC phenomenon is essentially one of a surge in manufactured 
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NICs  arise from high-volume exports in particular  kinds of  goods. 
Hence, we limit the analysis of  the changes in the composition of 
exports of the high-exporting transitional economies to the fifteen lead- 
ing exports at the three-digit  SITC level.  This focus on the fifteen 
leading exports is due to the fact that from a global economy perspec- 
tive, we are interested in those exports which by virtue of volume make 
a difference in world markets. It is not Korean exports in general, for 
example, which are  pressuring Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) import markets but specific high-volume, 
high-growth exports from Korea. The advantage of using the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data on 
the top fifteen exports is that it not only identifies these high-volume, 
high-growth exports but also shows the degree to which changes in 
factor proportions manifest themselves in shifts in the composition of 
the important exports in terms of volume. 
The countries designated as NICs are drawn from classifications of 
earlier studies. In particular, the NICs are those identified as such in 
the Chatham House study based on manufactured exports of $1 billion 
or more in 1976 (Turner and McMullen 1982, 12-13).  These NICs are 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in East Asia; Brazil, 
Mexico, and Argentina in Latin America; and India. The OECD in an 
earlier study of the NICs (1979) included the southern European NICs 
(Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Yugoslavia), which are also incorporated 
here. The next-tier NICs are the other developing countries of  East 
and Southeast Asia  (Thailand, the Philippines,  Malaysia, and Indo- 
nesia) and Colombia in Latin America. 
To gain an understanding of  the influence of factor proportions on 
the structure of exports of transitional economies in recent years, I 
have classified each of the top fifteen exports (SITC three-digit level) 
as natural-resource-intensive  (NR), unskilled-labor-intensive  (USL), 
and physical- and human-capital-intensive (P/HK), using the commod- 
ity classifications of Blejer (1978), which are  based on Lary (1968) value 
added per man. 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the trade shares by factor intensity of the 
fifteen leading exports for the sixteen transitional economies as well 
as the United States as a benchmark advanced industrial country. The 
cross-sectional results for 1978 are arrayed in table 7.1, and the changes 
over time for 1967-78  are given in table 7.2. The countries with high 
natural resource endowments (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia) 
are at the beginning of the ladder. High natural resource endowments 
remove  some of the impetus for an export-oriented growth strategy 
based on manufactured goods because foreign exchange requirements 
are more easily satisfied by natural-resource-intensive exports. In ad- 
dition to the reduced foreign exchange incentive, there is the “Dutch 177  NICs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies 
Table 7.1  Factor Intensities of Fifteen Leading Export Sectors of Sixteen 
Industrializing Countries (cross section, 1978; percentage of 
total exports) 
Intensities 
Natural  Unskilled  Physical or 













































































Sources:  Commodity classification is based on Lary (1968) in Blejer (1978). Data are 
from UNCTAD 1982, table 4.4, SITC (three digits). 
disease”  condition,  where  successful  natural-resource-intensive  ex- 
ports drive up the real wage in manufacturing, reducing the competi- 
tiveness of labor-intensive manufactured exports. Hong Kong repre- 
sents the opposite case, where the complete absence of natural resource 
endowments compels a manufactured-export thrust. 
Another pattern noticeable in these figures that has been attributed 
by Ranis (1983, 25-26)  to natural resource abundance is the skipping 
of  what Ranis and others call “the primary  export substitution sub- 
phase”  in which labor-intensive nondurable consumer goods are ex- 
ported. The figures show almost no exports of unskilled-labor-intensive 
goods for Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina and a larger proportion  of 
physical- or human-capital-intensive exports. This indicates that import 
substitution has taken place in labor-intensive goods, but exports have 
not been forthcoming to any significant extent. The export stage for 178  Colin 1.  Bradford, Jr. 
Table 7.2  Changes in Factor Intensities of Fifteen Leading Export Sectors of 
Sixteen Industrializing Countries (percentage of  total exports) 
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Table 7.2  (continued) 
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Sources: Commodity classification is based on Blejer  1978. Data are from UNCTAD 
1976, table 4.4;  and UNCTAD 1982, table 4.4, SITC (three digits) 
Note:  NR  = natural-resource-intensive,  USL = unskilled-labor-intensive,  H/PK 
= human- and/or physical-capital-intensive;  + ,  0, - = change from 1967 to  1978. 
these goods has been  skipped, and the countries have moved on to 
exports of goods higher on the factor intensity scale. 
This contrasts with the countries further up the country ladder (the 
next-tier  NICs),  which  seem to be  moving  from  natural-resource- 
intensive to labor-intensive exports; and in the case of Malaysia and 
Colombia, on to P/HK-intensive exports without skipping labor-intensive 
consumer goods exports. Nevertheless, the abundance of natural re- 
source endowments appears to continue to be a constraint on more 
substantial shifts in the structure of exports for these countries, as it 
is for the natural resource NICs. 
The Asian NICs, on the other hand, less endowed with or constrained 
by, as the case may be, natural resource endowments, show substantial 180  Colin I. Bradford, Jr. 
concentration in  labor-intensive exports  and increasingly  in  P/HK- 
intensive exports. The Asian NICs are closest in static structure to the 
European NICs. India and Greece have somewhat similar export struc- 
tures, which, compared to the East Asian and other European NICs, 
show some constraints on movement into P/HK-intensive exports. Spain 
and Yugoslavia, among the sixteen transitional economies, manifest 
the furthest movement along the factor intensity spectrum. The United 
States serves as a benchmark advanced industrial country with a more 
diversified export structure (only 56% of U.S. exports are accounted 
for by  the leading fifteen exports) and the largest  concentration in 
P/HK- intensive exports (36%). 
Table 7.2 presents the same kind of data on the structure of exports 
by factor intensity but, in this instance, over time for the period 1967- 
78. World export growth was quite high during this period compared 
with the 1980s. The European NICs show the most accelerated shifts 
in export structure, with very substantial reductions in the share of 
natural-resource-intensive exports and equally large increases in both 
labor-intensive and P/HK-intensive exports. Greece, in this perspec- 
tive, manifests a very different pattern from India, which is relatively 
stagnant in terms of structural change. A still more interesting result 
of this intertemporal perspective  is that Korea and Hong Kong had 
achieved high  labor-intensive shares of exports by  1967. Singapore, 
with a very much lower labor share in 1967, doubled its labor share 
while quadrupling its P/HK share by  1978. 
One wonders whether the Philippines, Thailand, and India are simply 
further down the scale with less physical and human capital formation 
or whether they are “stuck” in a high labor-intensive stage and having 
difficulty diversifying upscale to P/HK-intensive exports. 
The next-tier NICs exhibit the expected patterns further down the 
scale, with declining natural resource shares and increasing labor shares, 
but except for Malaysia, they have not reached the point where P/HK- 
intensive exports have been forthcoming. The natural resource NICs 
of  Mexico  and Indonesia actually show increasing  natural  resource 
shares over time as oil exports become more important. 
The data in tables 7.1 and 7.2 manifest patterns which are broadly 
consistent with a factor proportions explanation of structural change 
in trade. As one observes countries along the ladder of countries, or 
individual or sets of countries over time, the compositional shifts in 
exports confirm one’s expectations that, as economies develop, their 
factor endowments will change to an emphasis on physical and human 
capital, which in turn will change not only the basket of commodities 
produced  but also shift the comparative advantage of  the country’s 
leading exports. This general conclusion is also drawn by Lawrence 
Krause in chapter 8 of this volume, based on data for total exports. 181  NICs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies 
Some of these countries are noteworthy because of their unusually 
rapid industrialization and highly dynamic export growth, especially of 
manufactures.  The question is, can we identify causal variables that 
explain the reason(s) for the unusual growth and high export perfor- 
mance of the NICs as compared with other transitional economies and 
nontransitional economies. The NICs have been distinguished by the 
relatively accelerated rates of structural change, both internally and in 
their export shares. As Ranis puts it, the purpose of this sort of analysis 
is to discover “reasons for inter-country divergence of performance” 
(1983, 3). 
7.3 
Up  until  now  most  of  the  literature  dealing  with  the  NICs  has 
found that trade and exchange rate policies have been the principal 
policy  regimes  that  seem  to  have  played  a  key  role  in  promoting 
the surge in manufactured  exports from the NICs in  the  1960s and 
1970s (Balassa  1978; Krueger  1978;  Bradford  1982b).  Indeed,  the 
term  NZC is  meant  to designate  that  set  of  developing  countries 
that  has  been  sufficiently  successful  in  implementing  an  export- 
oriented  growth  strategy  to  have  become  significant  exporters  of 
manufactures  on a global  scale. 
As we  have  seen, countries  identified  in  earlier studies as NICs 
because of the surge in the volume of their manufactured exports also 
manifest dynamic change (with the exception of India) in the compo- 
sition of their exports. This implies that the unusual export performance 
of the NICs is based upon an internal process of economic transfor- 
mation and structural change. Chapter 1 and the country studies in this 
volume provide further insight into the dimensions of this internal pro- 
cess and its connection with export performance. If the NICs are coun- 
tries which have achieved exceptional rates of change in the structure 
of their exports and in their internal productive structure, then it seems 
likely that they may be distinctive in their domestic macroeconomic 
policies as well as in their trade and exchange rate policies. Indeed, if 
it is true  that the single most important  explanation of  NIC export 
expansion is a historic national commitment to an outward-oriented 
growth strategy which forces an unusually high degree of consistency 
in trade and exchange rate policies (Bradford 1982b), then it seems 
reasonable  to suppose that  macroeconomic  policies  would  also be 
brought into line with the basic national strategy. Furthermore, given 
the relationship between dynamic internal structural change and ex- 
ternal export performance shown in chapter 1, it would be expected 
that investment would be the key macroeconomic variable facilitating 
structural change in both its internal and its external manifestations. 
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This section will examine the relationship between capital formation 
and structural change among transitional economies and in other econ- 
omies in an effort to ascertain the degree to which the NICs are char- 
acterized by distinctive performance. The nature of the analysis is such 
that it is intended to be suggestive of general patterns that seem to 
prevail rather than to be highly conclusive. 
The data used here have been generated by the United Nations In- 
ternational Price Comparison Project (ICP) led by Irving Kravis, Alan 
Heston, and Robert Summers (Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982). 
The purpose of this work was to obtain real GDP comparisons based 
on international prices rather than real exchange rates. This was done 
by constructing a matrix of national expenditures on 151 commodities 
for thirty-four countries. “Real”  quantities were derived by dividing 
expenditures by national prices at purchasing-power parity. The “real” 
quantities, in turn, were multiplied by international prices which were 
generated separately. Sets of commodities at international prices were 
aggregated into GDP components so that ratios of  investment in in- 
ternational prices to national prices could be calculated. Each country’s 
ratio of prices for GDP as a whole to international prices was taken as 
unity so that an index, or ratio, of national to international prices for 
investment higher than one indicates relatively higher national prices 
for investment goods and an index of less than one indicates lower 
national prices for investment goods vis-a-vis international prices. 
The Kravis et al. work includes data on ten of the sixteen countries 
designated here as transitional economies. Table 7.3 shows the index 
of national to international prices for different types of countries (top 
panel) and for the transitional economies (bottom panel) for the con- 
sumption, investment, and government components of GDP. The pat- 
tern that Kravis et al. observe is that investment goods are more ex- 
pensive in lower-income  countries  than in higher-income  countries. 
The index for investment goods declines steadily as one moves up the 
country ladder from group I (lower-income countries) to group VI (the 
United States). The exception is group 11, which shows a substantially 
lower index (0.96) for investment goods than is consistent with the 
overall trend. Group I1  consists of  six countries, four of  which are 
transitional economies (Korea, Malaysia, Colombia, and Brazil) with 
very low investment indices and two of which are nontransitional econ- 
omies (Jamaica and Syria) with indices for investment goods well above 
1 .OO. This suggests that one of the key characteristics accounting for 
the above-trend-line pattern of structural change in transitional econ- 
omies is lower costs associated with capital formation. 
Table 7.4 examines the relationship between this index of investment 
prices and various measures of structural change for the ten transitional 
economies for which the Kravis et al. study has figures. Since invest- 183  NlCs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies 
Table 7.3  Relation of National Price Structure to International Price 
Structure: 1975 
Consumption  Investment 
Goods  Goods  Government  GDP 
Types of  countries (averages) 
Group VI  1.03  0.81  1.11  1 .oo 
Group V  1  .oo  0.91  1.31  I .oo 
Group IV  0.97  1 .os  I .04  1 .oo 
Group 111  0.96  1.13  0.93  1 .oo 
Group I1  1.01  0.96  0.86  1  .oo 
Group I  1.04  1.19  0.66  1 .oo 
Jamaica (group 11)  0.96  1.12  I .08  1  .oo 
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0.83  1.38  1 .oo 
0.90  1.31  1 .oo 
Source: Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982, table 1-8. 
Note:  “A  value of more than 1 for a given country in a given category indicates that relative 
to the relationship of the country’s prices to international prices for its GDP as a whole, 
its prices for that particular category are high” (Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982, 193). 
Group VI = United States; group V  = United Kingdom, Japan, Austria, Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Germany; group IV = Hungary, Poland, 
Italy, and Spain; group 111  = Romania, Mexico, Yugoslavia, Iran, Uruguay, and Ireland; 
group I1  = Korea, Malaysia, Columbia, Brazil, Jamaica, and Syria; group I = Malawi, 
Kenya, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
ment is the key variable, the table is organized in terms of gross do- 
mestic investment (GDI) as a share of  GDP. In nominal terms, eight 
of the ten countries have nominal GDUGDP shares between 20.0% and 
24.0%. Exceptions are Yugoslavia (29.4%) and Colombia (18.4%). In- 
vestment as a share of GDP based on international prices generates a 
different set of numbers. The table is set up in descending order based 
on the real GDUGDP shares, from Malaysia (27%) to the Philippines 
(15%). There is a break in the rank ordering between those with shares 
of 22% or higher and those with shares of  18% or less. Table 7.4  Capital Formation and Structural Change in Ten Transitional Economies 
Share of 
Investment  Per Capita Index based  Manu- 
Nominal  Goods  on International Prices,  facturing  % Change in  Debt 
GDU  GDUGDP,  Ratio:  197Sa(U.S. = 1.00)  in GDPb  Structure  P/HK as %  Outstanding 
GDP,  International  National/  (%)  of  Total  of Total  in  1981 (in 
1975a  Prices,  International  Total  Exports  Exports,  millions of  Producer - 
(%I  197Y (%)  Prices, 197Y  Invest.  Goods  1960  1980  1%7-78E  1978d  U.S. $)' 















23.1  23.3  0.99  36.8  28,4  20.8  29.7  29.7  13.63 
23.8  27  0.87  28.8  15.1  9  23  20  7.52 
29.4  24  1.25  41.8  36.3  36  30  18  19.65 
21.4  23  0.93  28.4  32.1  26  34  26  8.59 
20.2  22  0.92  22.3  18.4  14  28  44  18.72 
20.9  22  0.94  37.9  18.7  19  26  27  8.36 
22.6  22  1.03  61.8  48.9  -  37  43  18.96 
20.7  16.5  1.28  11.5  6.1  16  21.5  23.0 
18.4  18  1.01  20.0  6.5  17  22  16  1.88 
20.0  17  1.16  11.0  8.1  13  20  20  0.0 
20.3  16  1.29  5.0  1.9  14  18  6  0.0 
24.1  15  1.64  9.5  7.8  20  26  50  0.0 
4,627  (23) 
5,266  (18) 
43,999  (1) 
19,964  (3) 
42,642  (2) 
- 
5,026  (20) 
5,169  (19) 
17,903  (4) 
7,388  (14) 
aKravis, Heston, and Summers 1982, tables 1-6,  1-7, 1-8, and 6-4. 
bWorld Bank 1982; World Bank 1983, table 3. 
CRounded  from table 7.2. 
dFrom table 7.1. 
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There is a reasonably scalar inverse relationship between prices of 
investment goods and real GDI/GDP shares (columns 2 and 3). The 
lower the price of investment goods, the higher the real GDUGDP share 
and the higher the investment goods price, the lower the real GDUGDP 
share. Yugoslavia is the only serious exception to the pattern. To be 
sure, the national to international price ratio has been used to generate 
the GDUGDP ratios in real terms, but the correspondence is more than 
arithmetic. Lower real investment prices would be expected to induce 
high rates of  capital formation. In turn, the countries with the lower- 
cost investment goods and the higher GDI/GDP ratios would be ex- 
pected to be the countries with more rapid rates of structural change. 
By and large this is the case; the countries above the break in in- 
vestment shares are the Asian, Latin American, and European NICs, 
except for Malaysia, which appears to be the most promising next-tier 
NIC. The countries below the break are the next-tier NICs and India, 
which, as was pointed out above, has had a static export structure over 
time. 
Further measures are consistent with these findings. The per capita 
indexes of total investment based on international prices (with the index 
for the United States being 1 .OO) and of producer goods prices are both 
decidedly larger in the countries with low investment goods prices, as 
would be expected (columns 4 and 5). The share of GDP accounted 
for by manufacturing in 1980 is generally higher for the countries with 
the lower-cost capital goods and higher GDI/GDP ratios than for Col- 
ombia, Thailand, India, and the Philippines (column 6) and is well above 
the average for the middle-income countries as well (19% in 1980). The 
Philippines had a surprisingly high manufacturing GDP share in 1980 
(26%). 
The absolute percentage point changes (positive and negative) in the 
shares of exports from 1967 to 1978 shifting from natural-resource to 
unskilled-labor and from unskilled-labor to physical- and human-capital- 
intensive categories (table 7.2) is taken as a measure of structural change 
in column 7. Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Spain, and again, curiously, the 
Philippines are more advanced according to these measures than Ma- 
laysia, Yugoslavia, Colombia, and Thailand. India, as we know, scores 
very  low  in  these measures.  While  these data  seem less markedly 
consistent with anticipated patterns, recall that the countries have been 
scaled on the ladder of countries (tables 7.1 and 7.2) according to the 
size of export shares in more advanced factor intensities, whereas these 
measures show rates of change in export shares. Column 8 shows quite 
clearly that India and the next-tier NICs have not yet reached physical 
and human capital intensity in their top fifteen exports, whereas the 
NICs  and Malaysia have quite  substantial  percentages  of  their  top 
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The evidence found here suggests that one of  the significant factors 
explaining the high performance of the NICs is the relatively lower 
cost of investment goods in the domestic price structure of these econ- 
omies. Whereas the general trend found by Kravis, Heston, and Sum- 
mers is for investment goods to be more expensive relative to con- 
sumption and government GDP components the poorer the country, 
the transitional economies stand out as having lower-cost investment 
goods than would be expected relative to their place on the ladder of 
countries based on per capita income. Furthermore, there seems to be 
a reasonably  consistent  relationship between  lower-cost investment 
goods and higher ratios of gross domestic investment to gross domestic 
product, higher per capita indexes of investment goods and producer 
goods, and higher shares of manufacturing in GDP among the ten tran- 
sitional economies for which data were available. These patterns are 
more loosely associated with but still broadly consistent with the degree 
of structural change in the composition of exports by factor intensity 
and are highly consistent with the share of exports in the PMK-intensive 
category. There is a clear difference in the average outcomes between 
the NICs and Malaysia, on the one hand, and India and the next-tier 
NICs, on the other. 
These patterns would seem to indicate that NIC growth and export 
performance in manufactures have been accelerated by public policies 
that have lowered the cost of  investment goods. These policies could 
have been in the form of domestic monetary policy affecting interest 
rates and credit allocations to industrial investors and borrowers or in 
the form of direct subsidies affecting the price of domestically produced 
investment goods. These monetary and fiscal policies have the effect 
of  stimulating both the demand and the supply of investment goods, 
which in turn spurs capital accumulation, industrialization, and struc- 
tural change. 
These  policies  favoring  domestic  investment  have  been  comple- 
mented by extraordinarily high levels of foreign borrowing by the NICs 
during the 1970s (table 7.4,  column 9) at low if not negative real rates 
of interest. Hence, domestic monetary and fiscal policies affecting in- 
terest  rates, credit allocations,  and subsidies,  together  with foreign 
borrowing at low international interest rates to supplement domestic 
savings, appear to have been integral and consistent parts of an overall 
strategy of export-oriented growth based on trade in manufactures that 
help explain the unusually high performance characteristic of the NICs. 
It would appear that the focus of earlier studies of the NICs on trade 
and exchange rate policies should be broadened to include domestic 
economic policies and foreign borrowing. 
These general conclusions can be highlighted by comparing the ten 
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Summers study. Leaving out the United States (group VI), the eight 
Western European countries and Japan (group V), and Italy and Ireland, 
the other twenty-two countries in the Kravis study can be arranged in 
fourgroups. (See table 7.5.)  Two of the groups are from table 7.4,  except 
that Yugoslavia has been removed from the group of transitional econ- 
omies experiencing rapid structural change and put with Poland, Hun- 
gary, Romania, and Iran, countries which probably experienced “forced” 
structural change. They are characterized by high real GDUGDP shares 
despite high ratios of national prices to international prices for invest- 
ment. This suggests investment allocation through direct government 
intervention and planning and state enterprises rather than indirectly 
through interest rates or price subsidies or through the market. In ad- 
dition, there are eight nonindustrial, nontransitional economies in the 
Kravis et al. study (see Appendix), which constitute the fourth group. 
There are two broad patterns that can be seen in this table. The first 
is the basic difference between the rapid and forced structural change 
countries, on the one hand, and the slower structural change and non- 
transitional developing economies, on the other. It appears that the 
first two groups have been successful in either inducing or forcing high 
rates of capital formation and industrialization through lower relative 
prices for investment or through direct government action. The second 
pattern is the similarity between the slower structural change countries 
(India and the next-tier NICs) and the eight nontransitional developing 
economies included in the Kravis et al. study (Uruguay, Syria, Jamaica, 
Zambia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, and Malawi). While one would 
like a larger sample in both categories, the similarity in the variables 
for these two groups of countries and their large differences from the 
NICs and the planned economies cast doubt on the degree to which 
there is a real difference between India and the next-tier NICs and the 
nontransitional economies. That is, it can be questioned whether Col- 
ombia, Thailand, India, and the Philippines are in fact in the process 
of becoming NICs. The evidence here is not conclusive, but it suggests 
they are not. From the figures in this section, Malaysia appears to be 
the only next-tier NIC that is on the NIC path rather than on the general 
development path, and the other next-tier NICs seem to have more in 
common with the nontransitional economies than with the NICs. 
An  examination of  average annual growth rates in  the  1970s and 
changes between  1970 and 1981 in GDP shares of investment, manu- 
facturing, and exports and in “other” manufactured exports as a share 
of total exports of twenty potential NICs and the eight nontransitional 
economies in the Kravis et al. study sheds some further light on the 
issue. The figures for these twenty-eight countries are compared with 
the average growth rates and shares for the 100 countries in the World 
Bank’s middle-income country category (MIC) in tables 7.6 and 7.7. Table 7.5  Summary Table 
~~~ 
Per Capita Index Based 
on International Prices, 
1975 (U.S. = 1.00) 
Investment Goods Ratio:  GDI/ 
National/International  GDP  Total  Producer  Share of  Manufacturing 
Country Groups (averages)  Prices, 1975  (real) (%)  Investment  Goods  in GDP, 1980 (%) 
Rapid structural  93.8 
Forced structural  1.25 
changea 
23.2  35.8  26.8  28 




Slower structural  I .28  16.5  11.4  6.1  21.5 
Nontransitional  1.15  11.5  8.5  10.2  18.0 
Source: Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982. 
aMalaysia, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Spain. 
bYugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Iran. 
CColombia,  Thailand, India, and the Philippines. 
dUruguay, Syria, Jamaica, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, and Malawi 189  NICs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies 
Table 7.6  Average Annual Growth Rates, 1970-81  (percentages) 
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Source: World Bank, World Tables, vol. 1, Economic Data, 3d ed. (Baltimore  and London: 





Both in terms of growth rates and shares the East Asian NICs clearly 
exceed the averages for the middle-incomes countries as a whole, and 
the nontransitional economies generally fall well below these averages. 
Argentina consistently manifests below-average growth rates and shares. 
Brazil and Mexico, on the other hand, are above average in GDP, GDI, 
and export growth rates for the  1970s. Whereas the real spurt in  in- Table 7.7  GDP Shares, 1970-81 (percentages) 
Other Manufacturing 
ExportsiTotal 
GDI  Manufacturing  Exports  Exportsa 


















































































































18.5  24.9 
69.3  70.2 
69.3  70.2 
84.1  79.0 
19.5  27.6 
10.6  21.7 
21.9  20.5 
10.2  16.7 
34.0  45.5 
55.5  58.4 
33.1  44.4 
37.0  44.8 
37.0  44.8 
35.3  33.7 
35.3  33.7 




























32.3  13.4  21.3  43.8  52.9  5.8 
27.7  17.5  21.4  14.1  12.1  7.3 
26.7  16.0  19.9  16.7  24.4  7.9 
25.1  14.2  17.2  4.4  6.8  47.3 
29.7  22.6  24.7  19.1  19.0  7.5 
14.7  24.3d  26.3d  11.9  14.6  19.7 
22.4  22.8c.d  25.6C.d  17.4  14.6  10.8 
21.1  15.7  14.8  33.2  48.0  45.9 
23.2  10.2  18.1  54.0  35.6  0.2 
27.8  16.7  16.2  25.5  30.5  1.4 
16.5  16.1  16.9  7.8  12.9  56.8 
24.9  12.0  13.3  29.8  24.8  12.4 














Source: World  Bank,  World Tables, vol. 1, Economic Data, 3d ed. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984). 
““Other” is manufactured goods exports other than machinery and equipment (i.e., Other = SITC sections 
5, 6 (excluding group 68), 8, and 9. 
bGDP at market prices for manufacturing shares; all other GDP at factor cost. 
CIncludes  gas, electricity, and water. 
dIncludes mining and quarrying. 
eIncludes mining other than oil. 
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dustrialization in the East Asian NICs occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the manufacturing sector of the three large Latin American countries 
had achieved manufacturing shares of 25% of GDP by 1955 and then 
leveled off until the 1970s. The European NICs (Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece) also reached a leveling off of manufacturing as a share of GDP 
prior to the 1970s, because of a  jump in the GDI/GDP ratio in the 1960s. 
These industrialization trends in the 1950s and 1960s facilitated high- 
volume, high-growth manufactured exports from the Latin American 
and southern European NICs in the 1970s. By  1980, machinery and 
equipment exports as a percentage of total exports from Brazil, Mexico, 
Spain, and Portugal were almost double the middle-income country 
average, matching the export shares for these goods of the East Asian 
NICs. 
Data for the group in the forced structural change category (four 
Eastern European countries and Iran) are spotty and in some cases not 
strictly comparable with the other countries. Yugoslavia and Hungary 
have registered shares in the 1970s well above the MIC averages, but 
growth rates were less than spectacular. 
Colombia and India seem to fall below the MIC averages for both 
growth rates and shares more often than they exceed them. Malaysia, 
on the other hand, emerges as well above average both in growth rates 
in  the  1970s and in  shares by  1980-81.  These trends for Malaysia 
coincide with the earlier conclusion that Malaysia is a strong candidate 
as a potential NIC. Thailand and the Philippines experienced consis- 
tently higher than average growth rates in the 1970s. By  1980-81  the 
Philippines  had achieved above average GDP shares for investment 
and manufacturing and a higher than average share of total exports for 
“other” manufactured exports, while Thailand was consistently below 
average in GDP and export shares. 
Apart from the Philippines and Argentina, then, the data on economic 
performance  during the  1970s for these  twenty-eight  countries are 
broadly consistent with the patterns and conclusions derived from the 
analyses in the previous two sections. The East Asian, Latin American, 
and southern European NICs seem to be a select group of high-per- 
formance economies that have experienced  accelerated investment, 
rapid industrialization, high export growth, especially in manufactures, 
and changes in the composition of  their exports based on changing 
factor proportions.  Policies  encouraging investment  appear to have 
played an important role in facilitating the dynamic structural change 
demonstrated by these newly industrializing countries, since high in- 
vestment shares seem to be associated with the rapid industrialization 
and surges in manufactured exports of the NICs. Other aspects of NIC 
development strategies and performance are examined in the next sec- 
tion. 193  NICs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies 
7.4  Outward-oriented Growth Strategies and Price Distortions 
The success of the NICs in the 1970s in achieving dynamic export 
expansion,  accelerated  investment and industrialization, and  higher 
than  average  rates  of  economic  growth  elevated  their  adoption  of 
outward-oriented growth strategies to the category of a “new ortho- 
doxy” (Williamson 1983, 269). The policies which seemed to be suc- 
cessful in  implementing such a strategy were unification and deval- 
uation  of  the  exchange  rate,  liberalization  of  imports,  and  export 
promotion measures (Balassa 1978). There was at the time a mistaken 
identification of export-oriented growth strategies with free market pol- 
icies and fears of  the “Hong Kong-ization”  of the Third World with 
the diffusion of the new orthodoxy, based on the perceived preeminence 
of the Asian NICs. More detailed case studies of the Asian NICs (Hong 
and Krause 1981) and more thoughtful reflection revealed the hetero- 
geneity of  the policy mix in the successful exporters of manufactures 
(Fajnzylber  1981). Indeed, there was considerable government inter- 
vention in the successful NICs. Public policy is now understood by 
most observers to play a fundamental role in achieving an outward- 
oriented economic thrust quite apart from the degree of reliance on the 
market involved in each instance. “In no case has government assumed 
a laissez faire posture” (Marsden 1982). 
Nevertheless, the debate over the degree of bias involved in export 
and import substitution promotion continues (Streeten 1982; Balassa 
1983b). Furthermore, as the debt adjustment problem of the NICs in 
the 1980s came to overshadow the trade adjustment problem posed by 
the NICs in the  1970s, there has been a resurgence of the view that 
government intervention is inimical to achieving adequate adjustment. 
In  addition, the  stereotypical contrast  has been  reasserted  between 
Latin American interventionist import substitution biases and the Asian 
free market and export orientation biases  (Economist, 24 September 
1983, based on World Bank  1983, chap. 6). The Economist stated it 
crisply:  “Increasingly,  the two institutions [the IMF and the World 
Bank] have found themselves embroiled in the same set of policy issues: 
how can economies grow even when the international climate is un- 
favorable? The answer that the Fund and Bank give can be summed 
up in four words: get the prices right” (p. 39). 
Morgan Guaranty has drawn the same basic picture:  “a profound 
reordering of  priorities”  is necessary,  especially  in  Latin  America, 
requiring  “a basic reassessment of  the role of the state”  (World Fi- 
nancial Markets, September  1983). The widely read newsletter goes 
on:  “Strategies  based on import  substitution alone, which entail an 
anti-export bias, do not deliver enduring economic dynamism-as  can 
be seen in the contrasting records of Asia and Latin America” (p. 11). 194  Colin I. Bradford, Jr. 
It also asserts a divergence in economic adjustment performance: “These 
trends [in Latin America toward protectionism] contrast with the ad- 
justment strategies of most Asian economies, where liberalization (as 
in Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) has continued even in the face 
of balance of payments pressures”  (p. 7). 
There is a tendency in the literature to overdraw the contrasts not 
only regionally but in terms of the kinds of policy regimes which lead 
to success. There is an effort to link strategies, policies, and politics 
to each other so that pure forms tend to merge from the analysis, while 
reality is indeed more mixed.  Export-oriented  growth strategies are 
seen to be linked to realistic policies on exchange rates and interest 
rates and a reduced role for the state, thereby getting prices right and 
letting markets work. Import substitution strategies are seen to lead to 
a larger role for the state and more intervention in markets, thereby 
distorting prices and generating more severe external imbalances. In 
reality, the coherence of the different elements of a policy regime are 
rarely so clear-cut.  The connections between  strategy, policies, and 
politics are hardly pure or perfectly consistent. Reality is, alas, more 
mixed. 
Nevertheless, consistency among the different elements is found in 
some of the literature on inward versus outward development strategies 
and on adjustment in developing countries. Bela Balassa concludes a 
summary work on the subject based on the 1974-78 period by writing: 
‘‘Outward oriented economies provided, on average, similar incentives 
to exports and import substitution and to primary production and man- 
ufacturing, which inward oriented economies discriminated against ex- 
ports and favored manufacturing over primary activities. Outward ori- 
ented economies also placed less reliance on price controls and on 
interest rate ceilings than inward oriented economies. More generally, 
they gave greater scope to the market mechanism.  . . . Apart from 
affecting the efficiency of resource allocation, interest rates also influ- 
enced the amount saved. . . . By and large, outward oriented regimes 
were willing to accept lower rates of economic growth in the wake of 
the quadrupling of oil prices and the world recession in order to stabilize 
their economies and to avoid large foreign indebtedness. In turn, in 
inward  oriented  economies, except  for those  experiencing  internal 
shocks, foreign borrowing was used to accelerate economic growth” 
(Balassa 1983a, 172-73). 
If one goes back to the research work on price distortions mentioned 
in  chapter  1  that underlie the World Development Report (Agarwala 
1983) and the Balassa article (1981), it is possible to examine the degree 
of linkage among these elements and the assertions made about them. 
Tables 7.8  and 7.9 take the  NICs and the less-developed countries 
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Table 7.8  Outward versus Inward Orientation and Price Distortions 
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Source: Agarwala 1983, 20, 23, and 40. 
Nofes:  The exchange rate is the annual average appreciation of the real exchange rate 
during 1974-80  from the base exchange rate in  1972-73  (= 100).  The interest rate is 
the average real interest rate for the 1970-80 period. The distortion index is a composite 
index including seven measures of  distortion: protection of manufacturing, underpricing 
of  agriculture, the exchange rate, the cost of credit, the cost of labor, the pricing of 
infrastructural services, and inflation. I > E  means internal shocks are greater than 
external shocks. Country classifications according to Balassa 1981. 
and array the data for these countries from the research work on price 
distortions.  Whereas the basic conclusion of the price distortion re- 
search is that countries with high price distortions are found to have 
low growth rates and vice versa, table 7.8 shows that on the average 
there is no fundamental difference between the six outward-oriented 
developing economies and the eight inward-oriented countries in the 196  Colin I. Bradford, Jr. 
Table 7.9  Outward versus Inward Orientation and Country Savings, Growth, 
and Export Experience in the 1970s 
Domestic  GDP  Export 
















Kenya  19  6.5  -  1.0 
Thailand  21  7.2  11.8 
Tunisia  27  7.5  4.8 




Brazil  22  8.4  7.5 
Yugoslavia  27  5.8  3.9 
Argentina (I 1  E)  22  2.2  9.3 
Mexico (I > E)  22  5.2  13.4 
Turkey  17  5.9  1.7 
LDCs 
Egypt  12  7.4  -0.7 
India  20  3.6  3.7 
Philippines  24  6.3  -  7.0 




Jamaica  16  -  1.1  -  6.8 
Peru  21  3.0  3.9 
Tanzania  12  4.9  -  7.3 
Source: Agarwala 1983, 40. 
Notes: Domestic savings is the average domestic saving income ratio for the 1970s; GDP 
and export growth are average annual rates for the 1970s. I > E means internal shocks 
are greater than external shocks. 
degree of  price distortion (1.83 versus 1.94). The degree of price dis- 
tortion is small compared with the average price distortion index of 
2.44 for the twelve developing countries in the high-distortion category 
in the World Bank study by Agarwala (1983). 
Secondly, whereas there is a strong correlation between exchange 
rates and economic growth performance-stronger  than any other price 
distortion examined in the  study-there  is not  a  strong association 
between the annual average appreciation of  the real exchange rate and 197  NICs and the Next-Tier NICs as Transitional Economies 
inward versus outward orientation (96.4% versus  101.6%). These av- 
erages stand in contrast to the averages for the twenty-seven countries 
in the study clearly designated as having low, medium, and high ex- 
change rate appreciation of 94.3, 110, and 142 respectively. 
Thirdly, the outward-oriented countries on average have a slightly more 
negative real interest rate than the inward-oriented countries ( -  11.8% 
versus -  10.3%). This pales in comparison to the difference in the av- 
erages for the countries in the Agarwala study that have medium and 
high interest rate distortions of -  3.4% and -  14.8% respectively. While 
there is only a small difference in the averages between the outward- 
and the inward-oriented countries, the difference in the average is in the 
opposite direction of that anticipated by Balassa (1983a). 
Hence, on the average, there  is  no association  between  outward 
versus inward orientation and general price distortion or distortion in 
the two key variables, the exchange rate and the real interest rate. 
There are individual countries for which there is an association; Korea, 
Tunisia, and Thailand in the outward-oriented group show relatively 
low indices for all three price distortion variables. However, India, the 
Philippines, and Brazil, in  the inward-oriented group,  show roughly 
the same order of magnitude for these three measures. It is regrettable 
that the price distortion research did not include Hong Kong, Singa- 
pore, and Taiwan, because their inclusion in the outward-oriented group 
would have undoubtedly helped substantiate the new-orthodoxy view. 
Nevertheless, even if the addition of these three countries did change 
the overall averages substantially, their addition would  only further 
prove the unusual character of the three NICs and not enhance the 
generality of  the claim. The general point drawn from tables 7.8 and 
7.9 would still stand: there is a great deal of heterogeneity and com- 
plexity in the real world; we do ourselves ill by trying to simplify for 
the sake of providing a coherent policy framework. Ex ante advocacy 
of consistency does not mean that consistency can be found in country 
experience ex post. 
Contrary to the expectations of  the new orthodoxy, there is almost 
no difference between  either the average GDP growth rates  or the 
savings ratios of the outward-oriented versus the inward-oriented de- 
veloping countries. The savings ratios are actually slightly higher for 
the inward-oriented than for the outward-oriented economies, and the 
growth rates were higher in the outward-oriented countries despite their 
greater presumed internal adjustment. But these differences in the op- 
posite direction are not  significant. The important conclusion is that 
there is no systematic difference when groups of  countries are taken 
together;  therefore,  general  policy  conclusions  should  be  drawn 
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This cautionary note is confirmed when the average price distortion 
index is calculated for the four groups of  countries in  the previous 
section. (See table 7.10.) Compared with the averages calculated by 
the World Bank for the countries with low, medium, and high distortions 
(1.56,  1.95, and 2.44 respectively), the differences between the four 
groups of countries in this study are within a narrower range (1.64, 
1.71, 1.71, and 1.93). This, again, opposes any sweeping conclusions 
regarding the relationship of the degree of price distortion and the pace 
of structural change. It should be noted that the average real interest 
rate figures for the  1970-80  period given in the World  Bank  study 
roughly correspond to those implied by the analysis of real prices of 
investment in the previous section. Uruguay and Jamaica are the only 
exceptions.  Countries with rapid  and forced  structural change have 
relatively lower real interest rates than India, the next-tier NICs, and 
the nontransitional economies with slower structural change. (Uruguay 
is the exception.) 
Table 7.10  Price Distortions, Real Interest Rates, and Structural Change 
Price Distortion  Real Interest 
Index  Rate (%) 



















11.  Forced structural changea 
111.  Slower structural change (average) 



















-  7.9 
-  8.0 
-  5.0 
-  10.7 
-8.5 
-1.7 




-  7.3 
-  20.6 
-7.5 




Source: Agarwala 1983. 
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7.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with a number of issues relating to the NICs 
as high-performance  economies distinguished from other developing 
economies by their accelerated pace of internal structural change, high 
export growth, especially in manufactures, and high economic growth 
in the 1970s. The chapter explored various aspects of the salience of 
markets and prices, on the one hand, and economic policies and gov- 
ernment actions, on the other, in affecting economic performance. The 
nature  of  the evidence  and the analysis are suggestive  rather  than 
conclusive. 
The thrust of the evidence, the analysis, and the argument in this 
chapter is of  the same order as the World  Bank  research on price 
distortions but is in the opposite direction. The World Bank research 
concluded that  “prices matter for growth, though not only prices.” 
This research leads in the direction of concluding that policies matter 
for growth, though not only policies. It is difficult to see how the NICs 
could have achieved the unusual economic and export performance 
that distinguishes and defines them as NICs without the crucial input 
of government policies. 
Public policy commitment to export-oriented growth is the key ele- 
ment in achieving global status as an exporter of manufactures. Earlier 
research of  mine and others has emphasized NIC trade and exchange 
rate policies as determinants of their success. The inquiry and evidence 
here suggest that monetary and fiscal policies affecting the real price 
of  investment  should be added to the set of  policies considered  as 
elements of  export-oriented growth strategies. The Korea case study 
in this volume illustrates the point (chap. 10). The inclusion of these 
domestic policies further substantiates the importance of national com- 
mitment in  NIC strategies for integrating diverse policy instruments 
into a coherent thrust. 
However, in the same spirit of the World Bank research, it cannot 
be concluded that only public policies matter. The World Bank research 
states: “The findings reported here are a case for ‘getting the prices 
right’ and should not necessarily be interpreted as an argument for a 
laissez faire approach”  (Agarwala  1983, 46).  Similarly, the findings 
reported in this chapter are a case for getting policies right and should 
not  be  interpreted  as an argument for price  distortions  or,  indeed, 
against getting prices right. The argument here does assert that getting 
prices right is not the sine qua non of  economic growth and that the 
identification of correct prices with outward-oriented growth strategies 
is misleading. Part of the business of getting policies right is to provide 
ample scope for prices and markets to work as well. But it is surely 
not the only business of public policy. Indeed, some of  the evidence 200  Colin I. Bradford, Jr. 
here suggests that underpricing investment goods for a time through 
deliberate policies may be an important means of accelerating structural 
change and a key instrument in the strategy for becoming a NIC. It is 
also true, however, that subsidization of investment, while effective in 
facilitating structural change for a phase in the development process, 
can be overdone, leading to excessively  capital-intensive  industries, 
underutilization of labor, and overinvestment, if not judiciously man- 
aged (chap. 10, this volume). 
From the analysis presented here and in chapter  1, it seems clear 
that rapid structural change internally and in the composition of exports 
is central to successful development. There is a danger that, in cir- 
cumstances  in  which the world  economy is experiencing  trade and 
financial pressures (some of which have their origin in the new role of 
the NICs), the power of changing factor endowments to alleviate pres- 
sure through structural change will be underestimated. There is also a 
danger, however, that the capacity of  outward-oriented strategies to 
resolve the problems of slow growth, inflation, export stagnation, and 
debt may be overstated when these strategies are wrongly seen as the 
embodiment of free market pricing. Curiously, it seems more likely in 
trade policy that interventionist protection measures will be resorted 
to in order to shield industries from imports, when more rapid structural 
change would alleviate the fundamental problem. It also seems likely 
that  market-oriented policies  will  be  adopted  when  government-led 
export promotion policies might be more effective precisely because 
they accelerate structural change. The international economic policy 
debate is preoccupied with protectionism and orthodoxy when the more 
positive focus would be structural change and export promotion. Table 7.A.1  Capital Formation and Structural Change in Nontransitional and Nonindustrial Economies 
Per Capita Index Based 
on International 
Prices,  1975a  Share of Manufacturing 
Investment Goods Ratio: 
NationaVInternationaI  GDUGDP, International  Total 
Prices,  1975  Prices,  1975 (%)  Investment  Goods  1960  1980 



























































































Sources: See table 7.5. (Groupings according to Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982.) 
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Notes 
1. A similar concept of transitional growth for technology-based trade where 
economies move up a “ladder of countries” and a “scale of goods” is contained 
in Krugman 1982. 
2. “The stages approach to comparative advantage also permits one to dispel 
certain misapprehensions as  regards the foreign demand constraint under which 
developing countries are said to operate. With countries progressing on the 
comparative advantage scale, their exports can supplant the exports of coun- 
tries that graduate to a higher level. Now, to the extent that one developing 
country replaces another in the imports of particular commodities by the de- 
veloped countries, the problem of adjustment in the latter group of countries 
does not arise. . . . 
“A  case in point is Japan whose comparative advantage has shifted towards 
highly capital-intensive exports. In turn, developing countries with a relatively 
high human capital endowment, such as Korea and Taiwan, can take Japan’s 
place in exporting relatively human capital-intensive products, and countries 
with a relatively high physical capital endowment, such as Brazil and Mexico, 
can take Japan’s place in exporting relatively physical capital-intensive prod- 
ucts. Finally, countries at lower levels of development can supplant the middle- 
level countries in exporting unskilled  labor intensive commodities” (Balassa 
1977, 26-27). 
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